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The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an enormously powerful and, therefore, significant international institution for South Africa. Its 148 members account for ninety percent of world trade in which exports account for around a quarter of world GDP. The mandatory nature of WTO agreements, the single undertaking,​[1]​ the strengthened dispute settlement system, the robust trade review process, as well as its widening trade agenda means that it has a major impact on the economic well-being of all its members, including South Africa. Indeed no country, but especially developing countries, can afford to remain outside the WTO regime. Moreover, few developing countries can afford to remain politically isolated within the institution and given the structural and diplomatic capability asymmetries within the WTO, most countries seek alliances with others in order to counter these inequalities and thus strengthen their hand in negotiations. 

The WTO has strategic as well as economic importance for Pretoria. The WTO remains a vital international forum for both the projection of South African foreign policy as well as its international status in the post-apartheid era. It provides a world platform on which Pretoria can project and perhaps increase its power at international levels as well as increase its international status by constructing a positive image of good citizenship and responsible leadership to contrast with its pariah-state image of the apartheid era. Such a positive leadership image increases the potential for Pretoria to play a middle power role at international, regional and sub-regional levels.​[2]​

In this chapter I explore South Africa’s middle power role in multilateral negotiations through an analysis of its influence in the WTO. Although a relatively recent member, as with most international and regional organisations South Africa became a member of the WTO in 1994,​[3]​ Pretoria has quickly become a more active participant in WTO deliberations attempting to play, as I will argue here, a facilitating role between the developed countries and the developing and less developed countries. As a facilitator in the WTO, South Africa pursues diplomatic strategies that seek to project its own trade policy interests – with a key priority being increased market access, particularly in agriculture - within the neoliberal agenda. Since it introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR) in 1996 the ANC government has stressed the need for an export-led growth strategy and so it has a keen interest in supporting the WTO’s trade liberalisation agenda.​[4]​ At the same time it supports the negotiating process within the WTO by working to try to reduce the conflict and differences between the North and South​[5]​ and facilitate dialogue between these two blocs on divisive WTO issues.​[6]​ Its deep and extensive network of bilateral and regional relationships with developing countries, particularly African countries, as well as the majors, provides at least a diplomatic potential for Pretoria to be able to successfully pursue its economic and strategic interests in the WTO utilising a middle power facilitating diplomacy. Its Southern identity is well established, and its Southern commitments far-reaching and illustrated by policy programmes such as the NEPAD, as well as its active membership of various regional organisations such as the African Union, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).​[7]​  In addition Johannesburg has hosted development summits such as the 2003 Growth and Development Summit and the 2003 Africa Investment Forum. But like most developing countries, South Africa has extensive, and growing, diplomatic and economic ties with the major powers, and especially the US and the EU. These include the EU-SADC agreement (discussed in detail in Chapter XX), the 1999 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed with the US, as well as Washington’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for South African exports.​[8]​ South Africa is also a member of the group of key finance ministers dominated by the North known as the G20. This group provides Africa with close strategic ties to other key middle powers as well as the G7.​[9]​ Essentially, Pretoria’s  potential to act as facilitator rests with its unique position as an important regional middle power in the African context.​[10]​ It’s influence vis-à-vis the US and the EU largely depends upon how the two interpret Pretoria’s ability to both represent as well as carry Africa in the  ‘off the record’ ‘green room’ and ‘mini-ministerial’ meetings of the WTO.​[11]​  

Whether South Africa is able to carry-off and successfully propitiate agreement around the neoliberal agenda between the developed and developing countries in the Doha Development Round from its launch at the Doha Ministerial in November 2001 to the completion of the Round is, however, questionable.​[12]​ Principally, facilitation requires South Africa to be able to encourage Southern members to also sign up to the neoliberal agenda of the majors. Whether it can do this depends to a large extent on its influence within the various developing country groupings in the WTO such as the G20+,​[13]​ the Africa Group​[14]​ and the G90.​[15]​ 

One of the more interesting, and welcome, developments in the WTO during the Doha Round has been the increased activism of developing countries per se. As Kapoor notes, southern members authored ‘almost half of the submissions’ for the Ministerial Declarations at both Seattle and Doha. ​[16]​  This increased participation reflects a greater willingness on the part of the majors to draw key developing countries like Brazil, India and South Africa into the negotiations process, but it also reflects developments within the South that have increased their strength. Two developments in particular are worth noting. First, developing countries have increased their deliberative capacity by enhancing the skills of their delegations through increased manpower, training and better preparation.​[17]​ More noticeable, however, has been the establishment of the G20+ of Southern members which has actively opposed the majors on agriculture and the Singapore Issues. 

Recent studies have provided much needed details of the involvement of the South in WTO deliberations.​[18]​ As these studies show, however, Southern activism is largely restricted to the upper-income level developing countries and the middle powers. Most developing countries, and especially the less developed countries, are seldom involved in key decisions and seldom consulted during the deliberative process despite their involvement in alliances such as the LDC Group,​[19]​ G20+, G90, Africa Group, and the Like-Minded Group.​[20]​ Moreover, even most of the countries that do participate - including South Africa - seem to have little impact on the drafts and final texts of Ministerial Declarations and other agreements though, of course, as Cancún illustrated, they can have an enormous impact on whether final agreement is reached in the Ministerial Conferences. 

On substantive issues, however, increased participation by developing countries has not resulted in their increased influence during the Doha Round. As Lal Das notes, the Work Programme for the Doha Round that emerged from the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference was authored by the dominant powers who did not engage in ‘give-and –take negotiations’ on any of the issues but rather ‘put up their proposals and asked the developing countries to accept them.’​[21]​  How might this limited impact, despite greater levels of participation, be explained? 

Most studies explain developing country participation - and in particular alliance formation – in the context of material asymmetries. Southern members are generally unable to influence WTO negotiations because of the structural and deliberative asymmetries within the WTO. Unequal material power relationships within the WTO  ‘predispose developing countries towards certain negotiating strategies’​[22]​ with the optimal choice of strategies being coalition formation. According to such approaches, the asymmetrical power politics of the WTO creates the conditions in which coalitions become a ‘crucial instrument’ for developing countries to bolster their bargaining power and ‘offer a way out of their weak position.’​[23]​ That is, to solve the problems of power asymmetries states pursue collective action strategies. In this respect, rationalist approaches are highly prescriptive and seem intent on solving the problem for developing countries by identifying various typologies of coalitions and explaining which kind works for which group of developing country under which conditions.

The key assumption in this approach seems to be that if developing countries can increase their deliberative capacity by forming alliances to challenge the major powers, then they can look forward to significant influence in the negotiations. Unfortunately this has not been the case in the Doha Round. The G20+ countries have not been able to enjoy significant influence on issues of key interest to them despite the fact that several of these countries were part of the ‘green room’ and ‘mini-ministerial’ meetings. Perhaps developing country impotence in the WTO has as much to do with ideational factors as with material factors.  That is, the key problem for Southern members is the dominance of neoliberal principles within the WTO; there simply is no way of challenging the political economy model of the major powers at present. Quite apart from the hegemony of neoliberalism, Southern members have not been able to articulate an alternative hegemonic model.        

Developing countries like South Africa might be more active in the WTO, but the extent to which they can influence the rules and substantive issues of the Doha Round – rather than simply forcing a collapse of talks – has as much to do with the hegemony of neoliberalism as it does their ability to form and sustain alliances, that is, their strategic positioning. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond rationalist approaches to Southern participation in the WTO which tend to neglect ideational factors in order to more fully understand the limitations of developing country activism. 

It is worth making a further theoretical point. Rationalist approaches view the WTO and the multilateral processes within it as neutral rule-making and procedural instruments. We usually have to turn to critical approaches to find discussion of the normative dynamics within liberal governance structures such as the WTO.​[24]​ Rationalist scholars tend to assume that multilateralism is merely an instrument and framework in which to negotiate rules and procedures. As rules become more binding and procedures more judicial – as they have in the WTO – then power politics is replaced by the rule of law.​[25]​

Rationalist approaches tend to explain negotiation outcomes in multilateral institutions using formal modelling which is then used to evaluate the pros and cons of the strategic choices of states within known incentive structures.​[26]​ A similarly formal approach sees coalition formation within the context of developing country mediation roles.​[27]​ Both approaches, in common with rational choice theory, share assumptions about states’ interests in international organisations such as the WTO. In sum they assume that state interests are known, that they are self evident and singular, and that states can calculate which strategies will best serve their interests. 

Because they do not unpack the state, such approaches ignore the socio-economically constructed nature not only of states but also of the WTO regime and of multilateral diplomatic processes. Differing trade interests within states are constantly played out prior to, during, and after (when implementation issues come to the fore) WTO negotiations and as such state interests cannot be fixed, singular or even known during the negotiations.​[28]​ For example, we cannot even begin to understand the EU’s stand-off position on agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round without analysis of the political economy of agriculture within EU states. Furthermore, the notion that the WTO and multilateral diplomacy simply provides a rule-based negotiation framework ignores their socially constructed nature too. Like the states acting within it, the WTO is a product of hegemonic social forces within developed states that maintain power and domination through the prevalence of their neoliberal knowledge-claims. 

Thus to fully understand the diplomatic strategy of some developing countries, and in this case South Africa (which I acknowledge may well be an exception), and the limitations of the particular middle power model Pretoria pursues, we need to go beyond a focus on the material constraints and incentives placed on states to reach agreement and conform (as rationalist approaches do), to a focus on the ideational constraints and incentives developing country states face in WTO negotiations; constraints that manifest themselves at structural, regional, as well as state levels.​[29]​ 

Clearly we need to make room for analysis of the ideational dimension to South African activism in the WTO in order to secure a better understanding of its middle power diplomatic strategy which, I will argue, is driven by material and ideational factors. Both explain increased South African activism as well as the limited impact this is having in WTO multilateralism.
 

South Africa – Middle Power Facilitator

South Africa’s goals in the WTO are to advance its own trade interests while firmly positioning itself within the neoliberal orthodoxy. Thus it has argued for improvement rather than transformation of the WTO trade system; for fairer trade policy and practice rather than new trade policies and practices. In this context, middle power facilitation is limited to a strategy of seeking an expansion of the common ground the developed and developing countries occupy on the various trade issues.

The key features of this limited facilitation strategy are threefold. First, increasing activism in WTO processes. Second, uncritical support for the WTO system and its  neoliberal agenda. Third, alliance formation and maintenance. This chapter now turns to an analysis of each.

Increasing Activism in the WTO System

South Africa has quickly become an active and high profile actor since it joined the WTO in 1994, and especially during the current Doha Development Round. It was a frequent participant in the informal and much criticised ‘green room’ meetings at the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999.​[30]​ It was also an ever-present member of the several mini-ministerial meetings that took place between the Singapore, Doha and Cancún Ministerial Conferences throughout 2001, 2002 and 2003.​[31]​  South Africa even ascended to the role of ‘green man’, that is, ‘Friend of the Chair’, at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2002 when Alec Erwin, South African Minister of Trade and Industry, chaired meetings on rule-making in the WTO.​[32]​

At the same time that South Africa ascended to key developing country participant, the WTO has become a far more influential body in international political economy. Its binding rules already cover trade in goods, services and intellectual property, and if the developed countries get their way, will in the future cover investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation (the ‘Singapore Issues’). In addition, dispute settlement has been toughened up and a robust trade policy review mechanism is now in place.  With so much at stake in WTO negotiations it is no wonder South Africa seeks to position itself as an influential and active member. While this might be expected of most countries, and certainly of middle powers, we can note that not all countries have the capacity to be active members. Less developed countries in particularly have such limited resources that the size of their delegations are too small and lack the necessary technical specialisation to be influential. Indeed, around half of the less developed countries have no delegations at all in Geneva and do not attend the meetings. South Africa’s delegation is well above average with a permanent staff of five but below that of Brazil which has eight. This compares with Botswana with a staff of two.​[33]​  For South Africa, as with most other small and medium sized countries, influence at the WTO rests to a large extent on its ability to join or build and sustain alliances with other countries; both developing and developed. In this respect South Africa has been a key member of important  developing country coalitions such as the G20+, the Africa Group, and the Trilateral Group (Brazil, India and South Africa). Indeed, South Africa was instrumental in the creation of the G20+ which, for some is perhaps the most active of the various alliances within the WTO during the Doha Round.​[34]​ Pretoria has also found a place in the Cairns Group – a mixed coalition of developed and developing countries united by common interests in agriculture.​[35]​ 

Despite activism in each of these groups, South Africa’s chief position, and one which is controversial given the ANC’s historically leftist ideology, is best described as one of bridge-building between the North and the South.  This involves pushing the northern members, and particularly the US and the EU, to live up to follow through on their liberal commitments, particularly in agriculture where they have yet to implement Uruguay agreements on subsidy reduction and market access (which most of the developing countries, including South Africa, have already implemented). And on the other side of the bridge, South Africa works with the South to try to get them to go along with demands from the major powers to launch the Doha Round and include the new Singapore Issues in the Doha negotiations. This facilitator positioning enhances Pretoria’s relations with the US and the EU and is a likely explanation for the willingness of Washington and Brussels to accept South Africa’s self-proclaimed role as key developing country and main bridge-builder between North and South (this willingness being best illustrated by South Africa’s selection as a green room and mini-ministerial meetings participant and ‘green man’).​[36]​ Given the structure of South Africa’s trade relations, however, this positioning vis-à-vis the US and the EU  is hardly surprising and seems to be a sober and pragmatic response to South Africa’s economic dependence upon the two. At the time the Doha Round began for example, the EU accounted for around fifty percent of South Africa’s total foreign trade while the US was the single trade partner, described by the ANC as its   ‘number one trading partner in terms of total trade’ (South African Government Yearbook 2002-3).​[37]​ At the same time, however, this pro-US/EU positioning leads to mistrust of Pretoria by some of its African and developing country coalition partners such as Nigeria, Uganda, India, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Bangladesh who are far more critical of, and less willing to compromise on, US and EU positions on the new Singapore Issues and implementation of the agricultural agreements on agriculture. These acute differences undermine South Africa’s leadership credibility and influence within the G20+ and the Africa Group. It is notable that South Africa is not a member of the Like-Minded Group. This Group  adopted the most critical stance against the US and the EU. Such problems highlight the inherent difficulties and contradictions of South Africa’s middle power diplomatic strategy in the WTO.  Through their influence over the WTO Director General and Secretariat, the US and EU effectively select South Africa to take part in the deliberations in the hope that it can carry the G20+ and the Africa Group but Pretoria’s close relationship with the two severely diminishes its ability to do this.    

Yet this middle power strategy is vital not only in terms of the strategic and economic interests of Pretoria in the international political economy, it is also important for the effectiveness of the WTO regime. As a social construct, the WTO needs legitimacy and support from within as well as outside. South Africa can help provide this legitimacy, if only symbolically, by playing – or at least attempting to play - the role of facilitator between the North and South on some of the key trade conflicts that have dominated the organisation during the Doha Round. According to this view, South African participation can increase the common ground between the majors and the Southern members thus opening the way for agreement and the smoother working of the institution. Furthermore, Pretoria’s activism, and Southern members activism more generally, lends much needed legitimacy to the WTO as a governance institution in an age when it is roundly criticised as undemocratic.​[38]​That South Africa has become an active developing country member, involved in the many informal as well formal meetings, is seen by some including the ANC government itself, to signal an increasingly democratic WTO. But clearly this is a very naïve position and one that goes against all the evidence. The WTO decision-making process continues to be undemocratic and ‘tilted towards richer countries.’​[39]​ A very small number of countries are involved in the early ‘consultation’ process in the ‘green room’ meetings and the mini-ministerials organised and Chaired by the WTO Director General.​[40]​ Second, ‘green room’ meetings and negotiating committee meetings lack transparency. No minutes are produced. Instead the Chair submits a briefing to the WTO of his (seldom her) ‘sense’ and ‘understanding’ of the meeting. These briefings are then reflected in WTO Drafts such as Ministerial texts. Ministerial texts act as agendas for Ministerial Conferences, forming the basis for the negotiations.  Developing countries feel marginalised in this process and are, not surprisingly, often very critical of this procedure – which Kwa refer to as the ‘manufacture of consent’ ​[41]​ since their positions get lost in the system and are often absent from the Ministerial texts. This was certainly the case with the notorious ‘Harbinson Text’ which went through various drafts before it was submitted as the final draft for the November 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. Throughout its various drafting stages during 2001 developing countries submitted their positions on matters such as the TRIPs and Singapore Issues, but these, according to many members, were not reflected in the final Draft.​[42]​  The Nigerian delegation, for example, complained that the Harbinson Draft Ministerial Text ‘gives the impression that the whole membership is agreed to it….you know we have not agreed on this Draft. Our views and positions are not reflected’​[43]​ And because there is no record of the meetings since minutes are not taken and no records produced, then developing countries cannot substantiate their complaints. Developing countries may well be more active in the WTO, but most remain powerless in the decision-making process. Their influence is severely restricted since the WTO remains undemocratic and opaque and their proposals to reform the institution – such as the Africa Trade Minister’s ‘Abuja Declaration’ - have been ignored by the WTO Secretariat and the majors. 

While it is easy to identify South Africa’s symbolic impact, it is much more difficult, however, to identify substantive or procedural impact on WTO policy in key areas such as agriculture, cotton and the Singapore Issues. And procedurally, Pretoria’s attempts at North-South facilitation failed to prevent the collapse of the Seattle or Cancún conferences - though this is a harsh judgement since it is difficult to imagine how South Africa could have prevented either conference collapsing given the deep fault lines between members on issues and procedures at both. 

In light of these failures it seems more appropriate to refer to South Africa’s middle power positioning as one of co-option vis-à-vis the major powers rather than simply facilitation between North and South since Pretoria was largely isolated in its key alliances the G20+ and the Africa Group as I will show later in the chapter. Moreover, the notable absence of South Africa during informal WTO meetings in July 2004 where a modified post-Cancún agreement was reached suggests, perhaps, that the US and the EU recognise the limitations of South Africa’s middle power strategy. In the post-Cancún months of 2004 both appear to have concluded that South Africa cannot successfully deliver Africa and the other developing countries.​[44]​ They are certainly turning their attention to other potential facilitators. During the Cancún and post-Cancún stage of the Doha negotiations for example, Botswana, as leader of the G90, emerged as a strategically important potential ally for the US and the EU and was invited to a number of informal multilateral meetings.     


Advancing the neoliberal agenda in the WTO

The middle power strategy of South Africa has been more successful in advancing the neoliberal agenda in trade in the WTO. ​[45]​ Kapoor offers insights into how we might understand South Africa’s conformity with neoliberal orthodoxy by pointing out that:     

	…power fixes or privileges certain types of knowledge, and ignores and suppresses others, so that it is the knowledge claims of the dominant participants that tend to get naturalised .​[46]​


South Africa’s middle power strategy is founded on a commitment to the neoliberal policy priorities of trade liberalisation as well as a belief in the ability of the WTO to deliver development.​[47]​ Indeed, Pretoria sees no alternative for achieving development other than working within a robust rules-based liberal WTO. How has this ideological commitment come about?

Studies of the political economy of South Africa point to the prominence of liberal social forces – international capital and business groups – within the state which have forced an alignment to neoliberalism within the ANC government.​[48]​ As we might expect, the business community in South Africa has long been an advocate of neoliberal policy at state, regional and global levels. As it has come to dominate the ANC government (rather than the ANC movement which remains a leftist organisation) so it has come to dominate public policy. A key feature of the ANC government is the rich array of public-private partnerships that serve to embed the business community within the formal governance structures. This is particularly the case in trade and investment policy. In 2003, for example, the ANC government hosted an Africa Investment Forum in collaboration with the Commonwealth Business Council to formulate strategies on investment. As a result of business influence, South Africa’s trade negotiators at the Doha Round define the state’s interests in terms of trade liberalisation. The key policy goal during the Doha Round has been to secure market access to the developed country economies as well as an end to agricultural subsidies which results in the dumping of products in South Africa’s markets. At regional levels, too, and in the ongoing SADC-EU and US-SACU trade negotiations, South Africa is pursuing these same liberal policy priorities. 

This is equally true with regard to South Africa’s proposals on development. South Africa maintains that if the WTO can ‘address trade liberalisation decisively’ in the Doha Round then development can be delivered.  South Africa’s view of development is that developing countries can industrialise if they can access markets currently protected or dominated by the protectionist measures and subsidisation policies of the developed countries. Trade liberalisation would foster development by relocating  production and investment to developing countries in sectors such as agriculture where developing countries enjoy comparative advantages.​[49]​ In this way, South Africa’s own classical liberal view of the development process is not so different from Mike Moore, the former Director General of the WTO, who, on a 2002 visit to South Africa, stated that ‘development is trade and trade is development.’​[50]​  South Africa also appears confident that the other development provisions with the current Doha Round; the special and differential treatment with respect to market access, flexibility, and reciprocity, as well as the commitment to increase technical and capacity skills, can also help deliver development to all members of the WTO. Those less committed to neoliberalism have many doubts that special and differential treatment will do anything beyond fill the gaps in the international trade system by giving these states more time to adjust their economies to market forces.​[51]​  And other developing countries such as India have seriously questioned the extent to which the Doha Round can and will deliver on development.​[52]​ 

In summarising South Africa’s key objective in the WTO. Going into the  Cancún negotiations, Xavier Carim, South Africa’s Chief Director of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, stated that success at the  Conference ‘rests on developed countries to advance agricultural issues in order to advance the interests of developing countries.’​[53]​  Similarly, Alec Erwin stated that at  Cancún Pretoria sought to: 

Promote structural adjustment in the North, notably through reform of agricultural trade regimes and eliminating the protection of sunset industries. However, the only way to secure the necessary concessions is to participate in a broad round of negotiations in which the interests of the North (such as services, investment and competition policy) are on the table’.​[54]​

Carim and Erwin are voicing exactly the middle power strategy of facilitating agreement between North and South in the context of the neoliberal agenda and showing what others feel is a naïve confidence in the WTO multilateral process. Indeed the facilitating strategy was devised at the start of the Doha Round. A Department of Trade and Industry 2000 document sets out the diplomatic agenda of Pretoria stating that: 

	Part of our preparations externally has been to draw together key developing countries (i.e.Nigeria, India, Egypt and Brazil) around a common agenda and shared objectives in the WTO. This would also include developing common positions with our SADC partners… we have also shared the substance of our position at the OECD level.​[55]​ 

On all the key issues within the Doha negotiations, South Africa has advocated and supported neoliberal principles. No other Southern country has so comprehensively conformed to the orthodoxy. In the area of services, for example, South Africa supports developed country proposals to increase market access despite the almost complete lack of comparative advantages for developing countries in areas such as financial services, telecommunications, energy and transport. This position might be explained by the fact that South Africa enjoys some comparative advantage in services within African economies. In agriculture, South Africa positions itself with other developing countries advocating fairer trade practices, supporting proposals that would increase market access and reduce Quad (Canada, US, EU and Japan) country subsidies. In the area of industrial tariffs South Africa again wants to see trade liberalisation. Pretoria also supports proposals to eliminate tariff peaks and tariff escalation in the clothing and textile sectors of the economy where developing countries again have comparative advantages over the developed countries. On the Singapore Issues, South Africa’s approach is that new disciplines in these areas can ‘contribute positively to development’ and ‘not merely provide advantage to advanced economies.’​[56]​ 

In sum, South Africa’s commitment to neoliberal principles is sweeping and consistent. While most developing countries rejected US and EU calls for the launch of a new round at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference on the grounds that they wanted the WTO to concentrate on implementing the Uruguay agreements before negotiating new issues,​[57]​ South Africa greeted the proposal with enthusiasm. And throughout the Doha Round, the South African delegation has worked tirelessly to try to keep the negotiations on track. While most members of the G20+ and the Africa Group adopted a ‘won’t do’ diplomatic strategy in the negotiations – to use US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick’s characterisation - South Africa was quite clearly a ‘can do’ member. Indeed, as already stated, South Africa was an enthusiastic member of a whole range of informal and formal meetings, eventually rising to the insider status of ‘green man’ at the Doha Ministerial Conference.

As a ‘can do’ country, South Africa has adopted a ‘trade-off ‘ strategy in the Doha negotiations. This strategy sets it apart from most of its alliance partners in the G20+ and the Africa Group, who tended to adopt a ‘stand-off’ strategy vis-à-vis the US and the EU over agriculture, cotton and the Singapore Issues. At each point when the stand-off between the North and South threatened to de-rail the negotiations, South Africa lobbied within the G20+ and the Africa Group for trade-offs with the US and EU. Most notable was that rather than see negotiations collapse, South Africa consistently supported the US and EU proposal to include negotiation of the Singapore Issues in the Doha Round.  A few other developing states were also prepared to include the Singapore Issues, but these countries attached detailed conditions in agriculture.​[58]​ When the EU Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, dropped his insistence on inclusion of all four of the Singapore Issues and reduced his stand-off position to one issue – trade facilitation – it seemed that the South African strategy might indeed be working. But the developing countries wanted movement on agriculture prior to negotiations on any of the Singapore Issues. The EU, however, was not prepared to acquiesce, and so the talks collapsed.​[59]​ Most developing countries were happy with the outcome taking the position that ‘No deal is better than a bad deal.’​[60]​ The South African press and business community tended to interpret Pretoria’s diplomatic strategy favourably.​[61]​  To these sections of the community, South Africa’s position was a pragmatic one, involving a sober assessment of what could and could not be achieved. This is compared to the G20+ position that was seen in some South African quarters such as the conservative press, as well as in Brussels and Washington, as unrealistic and, ultimately, unachievable.​[62]​ 


Despite the collapse of the Cancún talks South Africa maintains support for the WTO process. In particular, Pretoria points to the breakthrough in the TRIPS negotiations to illustrate the usefulness of WTO multilateralism to developing countries.​[63]​ But for others the way agreement on this issue was sealed in the weeks leading up to the Cancún Conference illustrates the fundamental problems within the WTO. First, the deal that was finally thrashed out was very limited and represented a ‘deeply flawed compromise’​[64]​ because of the numerous terms and conditions that were attached to the compulsory licensing process. Critics also pointed to the undemocratic methods used to secure deals; only five countries – the US, Brazil, South Africa, India and Kenya – were actively involved in the decision to accept the US offer on trips in September 2003.​[65]​  As a result many developing countries that had not been consulted during the deliberations came to oppose the deal.

While South Africa seldom criticises the processes or policies of the WTO, most other developing countries are deeply critical of both.  They point to the lack of transparency and the existence of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the WTO as well as the growing trade imbalances and inequalities between North and South.​[66]​ But since South Africa has enjoyed a privileged position as a member of the decisive ‘green room’ and mini-ministerial meetings as well ‘green man’ status we might reasonably expect an uncritical stance from Pretoria on procedural matters. 

On substantive issues, the WTO fares no better in the eyes of many developing countries as well as scholarly critics of the WTO who argue that the WTO system fails the South on development policy issues. A clear case in point being the passing of the interim deadlines on agriculture and special and differential treatment without new agreement. And as to progress on development in the Doha Development Round:

No progress was made before Cancún on the development issues (Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries and implementation issues arising from the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements). In the Geneva draft, to the anger of the Africa Group and other developing countries, the priority of the implementation issues was downgraded, and the twenty-four Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) provisions were of little or no economic value.​[67]​

And all this despite record levels of developing country participation in the WTO on which Alec Erwin concluded: 

This is the first time we have experienced a situation where, by combining our technical expertise, we can sit as equals at the table…This is the change in the quality of negotiations between developing and developed countries.​[68]​ . 

While South Africa points to its frequent visits into the ‘green room’ and its chairing of the Rules Negotiating Group as evidence of a shift towards including developing countries in the negotiating process, critics again see this as evidence of the co-opting of hand-picked developing countries into the process.​[69]​ Many developing countries are suspicious of South Africa’s ‘green man’ status. Moreover, developing countries have chaired what are rather insignificant negotiating groups such as rules (South Africa), the so-called ‘miscellaneous’ (Ghana), and development (Kenya). The relatively low importance of these groups compared to the Singapore Issues and agriculture groups, chaired by the majors, has added to the mistrust of the system. As a Japanese commentator recently pointed out, developing country appointment as ‘Friends of the Chair’ was ‘meant to give the impression that the third world is participating in trade discussions as an equal partner, but that is not the case.’​[70]​   Developing countries are only participating at the behest of the Secretariat and they cannot hope to negotiate on a equal footing with the North in the WTO. Southern members are constrained by their dependence upon the North and the inequalities within the international political economy ​[71]​ The EU and the US in particular are able to dominate trade negotiations because they enjoy material and ideational command in the WTO.​[72]​ 
 
Critics also point to the inequities in the ‘reciprocity dynamics’ of the WTO negotiating process in which developing countries offer enough to OECD countries to induce them to take on the interests that benefit from protection.’​[73]​ . Bowing to the reciprocity dynamic - South Africa’s willingness to trade-off agriculture for the Singapore Issues – in order to save the negotiations, can be interpreted as an act of appeasement to EU and US interests.   

Supporting the WTO system is a key arm of South Africa’s middle power strategy and one that largely advances the neoliberal agenda. Trying to pursue this strategy within the context of active participation in developing country coalitions within the WTO illustrates well the contradictions inherent in South Africa’s multilateralism. Such tensions are probably inherent in any bridge-building strategy. ​[74]​


Alliance Membership and Formation

South Africa’s pursuit of alliance partners is typical of most middle and small powers in the WTO who have always tended to forge geographically-based as well as issue-orientated blocs. And just as the other two elements of the middle power strategy – activism and advancing the neoliberal agenda – exposed contradictions in this strategy, so too does this third element. 

Participation in a number of Southern member alliances in the WTO requires South Africa to publicly identify with the trade problems of the developing countries while at the same time positioning its trade interests and policies very much within the neoliberal paradigm of the developed countries. On the one hand it prioritises the concerns of the South, while on the other it pushes for trade liberalisation. Since South Africa is an exporting economy as well as the key developing country investor in Africa this is not surprising. But its dual nature as a symbolic leader of Africa and  major exporting country means that Pretoria has to develop what can be described as a promiscuous diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis various WTO members – that is, it has to seek out numerous and varied negotiating partners and groups. It is, therefore, actively involved in a range of groups within the WTO, while simultaneously conducting bilateral and regional free trade negotiations with many WTO members outside the framework of the Doha Round. Other WTO members adopt similar strategies. Mexico, for example, is a member of a number of coalitions within the WTO as well as regional agreements such as the North American Free Trade Association.   But it is South Africa’s unique position as symbolic leader of Africa, as well as a large exporting middle income country with a broad range of trade partners in the North and the South, that makes such promiscuity a strategic necessity.  Such promiscuity presents a number of strategic dilemmas, not least that its negotiating partners are very diverse politically and economically. They include the G20+ bloc of developing countries, the Cairns Group (which includes developed countries such as Australia and New Zealand), the Africa Group, the G90, and the Trilateral Group (India, Brazil and South Africa). Not only is this perverse on the grounds that it stretches the limited resources of the negotiating team, it can also leave South Africa fairly isolated within these alliances when differences over policy or diplomatic strategy arise, or when differences between the alliances and the US and EU arise.​[75]​  

In the Africa Group, for example, South Africa has spent much of its time in an isolated position on the key issue for this group, cotton. And from the onset South Africa also breached the consensus position of the Africa Group to oppose the launch of the new Doha Round.​[76]​ Although the Africa Group is one of the largest blocs in the WTO, dwarfed only by the G90, it is probably the weakest vis-à-vis the dominant powers. It suffers from internal divisions and because the members are particularly vulnerable to bilateral pressure from the majors due to existing preferential trade agreements and aid and finance programmes such as the AGOA and the Cotonou Agreement. But, apart from the cotton issue where the Group found a consensus position, there are also fundamental policy splits within the Group on agricultural.  Uganda, Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria for example, argue against substantive negotiations because they want to retain subsidies since they rely on imports of subsidised food and already enjoy access to EU markets through existing preferential trade agreements. South Africa and Tanzania, however, seek greater access to agricultural markets and therefore support negotiations on the removal of subsidies, anti-dumping and increased market access. The differences on agricultural subsidies left the ‘continent polarised into two camps.’​[77]​  Indeed, some less developed countries within the Africa Group remain deeply suspicious of South Africa’s position in agricultural negotiations because they experience the dumping of South African products onto their markets. Most of the products in Kampala markets for example come from South Africa. In sum, there seems little opportunity for South Africa to enlarge the common ground within the Africa Group let alone between the Africa Group and the majors. 

During the Doha Round South Africa also became increasingly isolated within the G20+ Group (a Group it claimed to ‘lead’) and was at loggerheads with its key strategic partners in that Group, India and Brazil. The differences between India and South Africa were particularly pronounced since India was adamantly opposed to any inclusion of the Singapore Issues and took a hard line stance vis-à-vis the EU and the US. This contrasts with the more flexible negotiating stance of South Africa. ​[78]​   

 Alec Erwin recognises the uncertainty in South African multilateralism in the WTO and has been critical of the poor negotiating strategies of the Africa Group. ​[79]​ Faizel Ismail has also argued that many developing countries lacked diplomatic skills in the negotiations that meant they could not be flexible to new turns in the deliberations.​[80]​   

Pretoria’s differences with its alliance partners were most pronounced during the final hours of the Cancún Conference where its delegation found itself isolated over the Singapore Issues. While South Africa offered trade-offs on the Singapore Issues, agreeing to demands from the US and the EU to include them in the negotiations for movement on agriculture, the G20+ refused to consider their inclusion. An impasse developed with both the majors and the developing countries holding fast to their respective positions. Alec Erwin made a last ditch attempt to break the deadlock, pleading with the Africa Group to support the final EU offer of including just one of the Singapore Issues – trade facilitation.​[81]​ But his move failed and since the impasse could not be broken, the Chair of the Conference, Luis Ernesto Derbez was forced to close the Cancún Conference without agreement.​[82]​ At this brinkmanship stage (which Jawara and Kwa  argue may well have been deliberately contrived by the US to prevent agreement on cotton ​[83]​), countries like Kenya in the Africa Group, and Mauritius in the G20+, fashioned a stand-off strategy that contrasted sharply with the trade-off strategy of South Africa. Clearly, South Africa’s willingness to submit to some US and EU demands were at odds with the more strident position taken by the Africa Group and G20+.        










This chapter has shown that South Africa has become an increasingly active member of the WTO, especially during the Doha Round. It has also shown the limitations of this activism such that, despite participation in influential meetings and membership of apparently influential alliances within the WTO such as the G20+, Pretoria can claim very little influence over substantive and procedural matters. Since its key goals were to secure greater market access then the continued failure of the WTO to make progress on agricultural issues means that the Doha Round is yet to yield anything meaningful in trade for South Africa.

Occupying the position of facilitator –proved to be a problematic diplomatic strategy for South Africa. Not for the first time, middle power diplomacy has failed to generate meaningful outcomes for the ANC government in the international system and the contradictions of its middle power strategy were all too apparent at Cancún.​[84]​ The attempt to expand the common ground between the developed and the developing world by advancing neoliberal knowledge-claims left South Africa isolated within the G20+ and the Africa Group and thus unable to deliver the South to the US and the EU on the key Singapore Issues. Pretoria’s decidedly Northern approach to trade policy brought it into conflict with other leading developing countries. India, Brazil and Kenya led the G20+ and the Africa Group in challenging the EU and the US on key issues, pursuing a stand-off strategy at Seattle and Cancún. South Africa, by contrast, insisted on offering a trade-off on the Singapore Issues for movement on agriculture. Probably because they have more years experience of WTO negotiations than South Africa, other Southern members such as India and Brazil were  better able to see the dangers in acquiescing to the major powers and instead adopted more strident negotiating positions on the key issues. Rather than accede to US and EU demands, the other members of the G20+ and Africa Group grasped a rare opportunity to delay the inclusion of the Singapore Issues onto the WTO agenda until satisfactory progress had been made on implementing the Uruguay agreements on agriculture. South Africa’s trade-off strategy left many developing countries, and African states in particular, feeling that the South African delegation had been too close to US and EU positions throughout the Doha negotiations.  In supporting the launch of the Doha Round against the opposition of the Africa Group and in supporting the inclusion of the Singapore Issues when the G20+ and the Africa Group rejected their inclusion, South Africa did appear to rally round EU and US positions in the negotiations. This was strategically naïve. Indeed, Dot Keet has argued that the South African delegation was tactically naïve throughout the negotiations and is particularly critical of the tendency of the delegation to show their hand prematurely as in the case of the Singapore Issues.​[85]​   

As we survey the wreckage of the collapsed Cancún Conference there are many disappointments, not least the continued lack of progress on development matters. South Africa too must feel disappointed that its middle power strategy means that it now lacks the diplomatic credibility vis-à-vis the US and the EU as well as the trust of  the G20+ and the Africa Group to carve out for itself an effective facilitating role in the WTO. Given its failure to significantly influence the Cancún negotiations Iit is not surprising, therefore, that South Africa was not invited to participate in the post-Cancún mini-ministerial meetings that led to the modified agreement of July 2004. 

The contradictions in South Africa’sthe middle power strategy at the WTO cannot be easily overcome. This chapter has argued that South Africa’s middle power strategy has a neoliberal dimension at its core. Given the deeply embedded nature of the neoliberal political economy at the state and international level, it is unlikely that South Africa will weaken its commitments to neoliberal multilateralism.  Neither can it easily ignore its commitments, however rhetorical, to working with other developing countries to addresses developing country development issues – as embodied in the NEPAD. Pretoria failed in its The attempt to satisfy its neoliberal patrons in the North (as well as those within the South African state) and its development partners in the South in the Doha Roundwas ineffectual. South African middle power diplomacy appears to have reached its limits in view of the growing North-South divide within the WTO.        
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